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CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER DEPENDENTS AND
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE ARMED FORCES
OVERSEAS
The armed forces of the United States are stationed in 63 coun-
tries throughout the world. In addition to the military personnel at
our overseas bases, there are generally two other classes of American
citizens also present: (1) civilian employees of the armed forces
and (2) dependents of servicemen and civilian employees. This paper
deals with the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction over members
of these latter two groups for crimes committed by them on foreign
soil in times of peace.
Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice purports
to subject ". . . all persons serving with, employed by, or accompany-
ing the armed forces without the continental limits of the United
States . . ."I to the jurisdiction of military court martial. However,
in a recent series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has held
article 2(11) unconstitutional as applied to these two classes of civil-
ians. The result is that at present no American court may try them
for crimes committed overseas.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to consider the con-
stitutional analysis used by the Court in reaching this conclusion;
and (2) to explore the possible alternatives available to Congress to
provide for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over these persons.
ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Ordinarily, when an American citizen commits a federal offense,
he is tried by a civil tribunal deriving its power from article III of
the Constitution.2 By specific constitutional provision, he is entitled,
inter dia, to a trial by jury after indictment by a grand jury.'
Trial by court martial, on the other hand, is the exercise of an extra-
ordinary jurisdiction arising from the power granted to Congress "To
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces."14 The procedures prescribed by the Uniform Code of
Military Justice for the conduct of a military court martial differ
1 10 U.S.C. § 802 (11) (1950).
2 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
3 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2: "The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by jury.. . ." U.S. Const. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand jury.. . ." U.S. Const. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed ......
4 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, d. 14.
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markedly from those of civil courts, perhaps the most significant dif-
ference being the absence of any requirement for a jury trial or for
a grand jury indictment.5
The determination of the limits on Congress' power to subject
civilian employees and dependents to the jurisdiction of the military
courts overseas required the decision of two principal questions:
(1) whether the Constitution protects an American citizen overseas;
and (2) whether civilian employees and dependents are in close
enough relation to the land and naval forces to be considered a part
thereof.
The Reach of Constitutional Guarantees
The members of the Court are in unanimous agreement that
fundamental constitutional guarantees such as those provided by
article III and the fifth and sixth amendments continue to protect
American citizens against governmental action when they are out-
side the United States. This conclusion is based upon a literal inter-
pretation of the language of these provisions. In the words of Mr.
Justice Black, "The language of Art. III § 2 manifests that the con-
stitutional protections for the individual were designed to restrict the
United States government when it acts outside of this country, as
well as here at home." 6 Even if it is only "fundamental" rights which
follow a citizen overseas,' one could hardly imagine a more jealously
guarded or more cherished right than the right to jury trial., In
arriving at this conclusion, the Court was forced to dispose of, as
inapposite, the "consular" 9 and "insular"'" cases which, on the first
G See 10 U.S.C. §§ 836-854 (1950) for trial procedure in the military courts.
6 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7 (1957).
7 See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 144-149 (1904).
8 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16, 18-19 (1955); Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 122-123 (1866); 3 Blackstone's Commentaries 379 (1765).
9 In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), involved a seaman who had killed a ship's officer
on an American ship in Japanese waters. He was seized and tried before a consular
"court" in Japan under a statute authorizing American consuls to try American citizens
charged with committing crimes in Japan and certain other "non-Christian" countries.
Justice Black stated that this case is one of those which cannot be understood except
in its peculiar setting, that it was doubtful if a similar result would be reached today
and that "at best the Ross case should be left as a relic from a different era." Reid v.
Covert, supra note 6, at 12.
10 Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) ; Dorr v. United States, supra note 7;
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
These cases involved territories which had recently been conquered or acquired by the
United States and which had entirely different cultures and customs from those of this
country. It would have been inexpedient to require jury trial after indictment by grand
jury in these possessions. "None of these cases had anything to do with military trials
and they cannot properly be used as vehicles to support an extension of military juris-
diction to civilians." Reid v. Covert, supra note 6, at 14.
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hearing of Reid v. Covert, had been the basis for the holding that an
American citizen outside the United States is not entitled, as a matter
of constitutional right, to trial before an article III court for an of-
fense committed abroad.1
Relation to the Land and Naval Forces
The more difficult constitutional issue is whether civilian em-
ployees and/or dependents accompanying the armed forces overseas,
fall within the scope of Congress' power "To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." 2 It has
been held that this clause creates an exception to the normal consti-
tutional requirement of trial in civil courts and permits Congress to
authorize military trial of members of the armed forces without
according all the safeguards given an accused by article III and the
Bill of Rights.' 3 A finding that the civilians in question are a part
of the armed forces for this purpose would therefore render them
amenable to court martial jurisdiction in spite of the extraterritorial
reach of constitutional guarantees.
(a) Dependents
The argument in favor of including dependents within the scope
of Congress' power to regulate the armed forces is based upon an
application of the necessary and proper clause to the article I
grant. The contention is that from a morale standpoint, there is a
pressing need for dependents to accompany American forces abroad;
that such dependents affect the military community as a whole; that
their status as an integral part of the military community requires
disciplinary control over them by the military commander; that the
effectiveness of this control depends upon a readily available ma-
chinery affording a prompt sanction and resulting deterrent available
only through court martial jurisdiction; and that court martial juris-
diction is not only inherently fair, but there are no alternatives to
it.'4 These considerations, it is said, make it necessary and proper
for Congress to include dependents within the scope of court martial
jurisdiction in exercising its power to regulate the armed forces.
The Court rejected this argument in the landmark decision of
Reid v. Covert,15 a case involving a serviceman's wife charged with
11 See Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
12 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, ci. 14.
13 Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.)
65 (1857).
14 Supplemental Brief for Appellant and Petitioner on Rehearing, Reid v. Covert,
supra note 6, at 49.
15 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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the murder of her husband on an Air Force base in England. Four
justices were of the opinion that Congress' power to prescribe rules
for the government of the armed forces is limited to the class de-
scribed, namely, "the land and naval Forces," and that the necessary
and proper clause may not be used to extend military jurisdiction
to any group beyond that class, no matter what the necessity because
of the overriding importance of the protections afforded by the article
III courts. "Having run up against the steadfast bulwark of the Bill
of Rights, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot extend the scope
of Clause 14. ' '16 Justices Harlan and Frankfurter concurred in the
result on the narrow ground that article 2 (11) could not be applied
to a dependent charged with a capital offense, where the "awesome
finality" of the death penalty required the balance of conflicting in-
terests to be resolved in favor of the accused.17
The opinion of the Court in Covert suggested that the test for
court martial jurisdiction is one of status and that dependents as a
class do not fall within the scope of Congress' power to regulate the
armed forces. However, this was not a majority opinion, and the case
decided only that dependents charged with capital offenses are not
subject to court martial jurisdiction. The question remained whether
the Court would adopt this test in cases involving non-capital offenses
or whether it would find the balance in favor of the government in
such cases, where the importance of maintaining military discipline
is equally present, but where the irrevocable conclusiveness of the
death penalty is no longer a factor.
Kinsella v. Singleton 8 provided the answer. The majority opinion,
adopting the status test, held that no constitutional distinction can be
drawn between capital and non-capital offenses and that continued
adherence to Covert required a holding that dependents may not be
tried by military tribunal no matter what the nature of the offense.
In refusing to make a "fresh evaluation and a new balancing" for
non-capital cases, the Court said:
If civilian dependents are included in the term "land and naval
Forces" at all, they are subject to the full power granted the Con-
gress therein to create capital as well as non-capital offenses. This
Court cannot diminish and expand that power, either on a case-by-
case basis or on a balancing of the power there granted Congress
against the safeguards of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.' 9
If the "status" premise is sound, the result in Singleton was
16 Id. at 21.
1 Id. at 41-64, 65-78.
18 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
'9 Id. at 246.
1960)
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
clearly dictated by the Covert decision, since that case would have
the effect of excluding dependents as a class from the scope of Con-
gress' power under the article I grant. If it is not sound, then the
argument that considerations of morale and military discipline make
it necessary that court martial jurisdiction extend to civilian de-
pendents in non-capital cases, a judgment which Congress has mani-
fested by enacting article 2 (11), has considerable validity. The
express power to govern and regulate the armed forces, when read in
connection with the necessary and proper clause, could be taken
as including the power to govern civilians accompanying those forces
overseas; and the only effect of the Covert decision would be to say
that trial of such persons by court martial in capital cases is not an
appropriate exercise of that power.20
The majority's restrained view of the effect of the necessary
and proper clause on Congress' power to regulate the armed forces
contrasts sharply with the Court's use of that clause in defining the
constitutional limits of federal power under the commerce clause.
It has been held, for example, that Congress has the power to regu-
late an individual's production of wheat not intended in any part for
commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm because such local
activity, if unregulated, might exert a substantial, adverse economic
effect on interstate commerce.1 In other words, in exercising its
20 In adopting the "status" test in the Singleton case, seven members of the Court
concurred in the view that the necessary and proper clause is "not itself a grant of
power, but a caveat that the Congress possesses all of the means necessary to carry out
the specifically granted 'foregoing' powers of § 8, Kinsella v. Singleton, . . . " supra note
18, at 247. See also, concurrence of justices Whittaker and Stewart on this point, Kin-
sella v. Singleton, supra note 18, at 263. Accordingly, if Congress was not granted the
power to prescribe military trial for dependents in clause 14, it does not have it. The
Court relied heavily on United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, supra note 8, a case
involving a discharged soldier who was tried by court martial after his discharge from
the Army, for an offense committed before his discharge. In that case the Court invoked
the doctrine calling for "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed" and
held that the ex-serviceman could not be tried by court martial. Justices Harlan and
Frankfurter took a different view of the effect of the necessary and proper clause.
Citing Mr. justice Brandeis in Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 300-301 (1920),
they argued that the necessary and proper clause is an express power of Congress.
"The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be used to 'expand' powers which are other-
wise constitutionally limited, but that is only to say that when an asserted power is
not appropriate to the exercise of an express power, to which all 'necessary and proper'
powers must relate, the asserted power is not a 'proper' one." Kinsella v. Singleton,
supra note 18, at 254-55. Therefore, although it is "improper" for the Congress to
prescribe trial of dependents overseas by court martial in capital cases, it may still be
"proper" to prescribe such trial in non-capital cases in order to carry out effectively its
power to regulate the armed forces.
21 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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power "To regulate Commerce ... among the several States... "'
Congress has the power to regulate intrastate activities having a sub-
stantial effect on the interstate activity which is the principal subject
of regulation 2 3 By analogy it can be argued that Congress has the
power to govern by reasonable means those non-members of the armed
forces whose presence in the military community affects the accom-
plishment of the military mission. The failure of the Court to draw
this analogy reflects a higher regard for civil liberty than for economic
liberty.
(b) Civilian Employees
The rationale utilized by the Court in deciding whether military
jurisdiction could be extended constitutionally to cover civilian em-
ployees is consistent with the Covert and Singleton cases, but perhaps
somewhat less tenable. In Grisam v. Hagan,2 4 a case involving a
capital offense, the majority held that a civilian employee charged
with a capital crime must have the benefit of a jury and therefore
may not be tried by military court martial. The Court could see no
distinction between dependents and employees sufficient to take the
latter out of the rule of the Covert case. As for military jurisdiction
over lesser offenses committed by employees, the "status" test of
Kinsella v. Singleton required a holding of no jurisdiction 25
It may be questioned whether in so holding the Court took suffi-
cient notice of the distinction which can be drawn between dependents
and employees and whether the latter may not be considered a "part
of" the armed forces so as to bring them directly within the scope
of Congress' power under article I, section 8, clause 14. Their relation-
ship to the military establishment was described by Justice Whittaker
in the following terms:
[Civilian employees], numbering more than 25,000 employed at
United States bases located in 63 countries throughout the world-
mainly highly trained specialists and technicians possessing skills
not readily available to the armed forces--are engaged in purely
military work ...These civilian employees thus perform essential
services for the military and, in doing so, are subject to the orders,
direction and control of the same military command as the "mem-
bers" of those forces; and, not infrequently, members of those
forces who are assigned to work with and assist those employees
are subject to their direction and control. They have the same
contact with, and information concerning, the military operations
22 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cd. 3.
23 See also The Shreveport Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (power of I.C.C. to order
increase in intrastate railroad rates where latter are causing discrimination against inter-
state commerce).
24 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
25 McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
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as members of those forces and present the same security risks and
disciplinary problems. They are paid upon the same payroll, and
have the same commissary, housing, medical, dental, mailing, trans-
portation, banking, tax exemption, customs benefits, border crossing
privileges, and other privileges as members of the armed forces.
They are so intertwined with those forces and military communities
as to be, in every practical sense, an integral part of them. 26
By contrast, dependents perform no direct services for the armed
forces and thus stand in different relationship thereto. Mr. Justice
Whittaker argued that the historical materials show that the framers
of the Constitution were aware of the necessity of court martial juris-
diction over civilians serving with the armed forces,2 7 that the Articles
of War provided for such jurisdiction from the beginning,2 and that
the Court has consistently held in various contexts that clause 14
does not limit the power of Congress to the government and regulation
of only those persons who are "members" of the armed forces. 9
The above factors would seem to provide ample ground for dis-
tinguishing Covert and Singleton and holding civilian employees sub-
ject to court martial jurisdiction. The fact that the Court chose not
to do so indicates that there are basic policy considerations militating
against any extension of the jurisdiction of the military courts.
Policy Considerations
Perhaps the most fundamental policy underlying these decisions
is the long standing notion that military power should be subordinate
to civilian authority. Declared Mr. Justice Black in Reid v. Covert:
We should not break faith with this nation's tradition of keeping
military power subservient to civilian authority, a tradition which
we believe is firmly embedded in the Constitution . . . [U]nder
our Constitution courts of law alone are given power to try civilians
for their offenses against the United States.3 0
Any recogntion of court martial jurisdiction over civilians operates
in contravention of this policy.
Second, and perhaps equally influential, is the fear on the part
of the Court that military courts are subject to uncontrollable abuse
which in any given case might result in injustice to the accused.
... [T] he business of soldiers is to fight and prepare to fight wars,
not to try civilians for their alleged crimes . . . [T] here has
26 Kinsella v. Singleton, supra note 18, at 264-65.
27 Id. at 266-69.
28 Id. at 269-71.
29 Id. at 271-72. It should be noted that the majority arrived at conflicting con-
clusions from its review of the historical materials, id. at 235-249.
30 Reid v. Covert, supra note 15, at 40.
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always been less emphasis in the military on protecting the rights
of the individual than in civilian society and in civilian courts.3 1
The additional facts that military tribunals are ad hoc bodies subject
to varying degrees of command influence, that military law is fre-
quently cast in sweeping and vague terms, and that it is subject to
amendment in certain instances by the President, without the aid
of the Congress, 32 contribute to the Court's basic distrust of the
military tribunal as a guarantor of constitutional rights.
Thus, in expressing its reluctance to extend the scope of article I,
section 8, clause 14, of the Constitution any further than absolutely
necessary, the Court has drawn the line at the point where a person
ceases to be an actual member of one of the branches of the armed
forces. All others are outside the scope of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice and may not be tried by court martial. Assuming that
some form of control over civilians employed by and accompanying
the armed forces overseas is necessary in order to carry out effectively
the military mission, what practical alternatives are now available to
Congress to provide such control? This is the question to be con-
sidered in the pages which follow.
ALTERNATIVES
The writer is unaware of any efforts by Congress since the
Covert decision was announced in 1957 to provide for the exercise
of federal criminal jurisdiction over dependents and civilian employees
for crimes committed overseas. In the United States these persons
are subject to the general criminal laws of the state and federal gov-
ernments and are tried in the state and federal constitutional courts.33
However, while overseas with the armed forces they are beyond the
reach of American law since the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
the sole body of federal law purporting to govern their conduct, has
been, as to them, declared unconstitutional. One reason for Congress'
delay in enacting remedial legislation has been to await the decision
by the Supreme Court of cases testing the scope of the Covert doc-
trine. Now that those cases have been decided, it is time to consider
what form such legislation, if any, should take. No attempt will be
made in the limited space here available to detail a legislative scheme
to meet the problem. The attempt will be merely to suggest several
possible solutions and to discuss some of the legal and practical diffi-
culties inherent in each.
31 Id. at 35-36.
32 Id. at 36-39.
33 For a discussion of procedure for trying civilian dependents and employees for
crimes committed in the United States, see Reply Brief for Appellant and Petitioner
on Rehearing, Reid v. Covert, supra note 15, at 71-73.
1960]
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There are at least two important qualifications which any pro-
posed legislation must meet in order to be acceptable. First, it must
provide a system of courts affording the accused all the constitutional
protections available to a defendant in an article III court sitting in
the United States. This is the mandate of the Covert doctrine. Second,
it must be acceptable to each of the 63 nations in which our armed
forces are stationed. Although Congress undoubtedly has the power
to prescribe which acts committed by civilians accompanying the
armed forces abroad shall be criminal,34 it does not have the power
to provide for the trial of offenders in a foreign country without the
consent of that country.3 5 Trial in the United States could, of course,
be authorized without the acquiescence of the country in which the
offense was committed; but, as a practical matter, where the receiving
state had custody of a civilian employee or dependent charged with
a violation of its law, the consent of that country would be necessary
before the United States could obtain custody of the accused. There-
fore, any new arrangements regarding federal criminal jurisdiction
over these persons will depend for their ultimate validity upon suc-
cessful renegotiation of our agreements with the host states.
Presumably a criminal code applicable to civilian dependents and
employees would be quite similar in its substantive provisions to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice since Congress has already indi-
cated in that enactment what standards of conduct it will require of
them. Proceeding on this assumption, it is clear that the new code
would prescribe two broad categories of crimes: (1) those which
would also be violations of the law of the receiving state, e.g., murder,
rape, larceny, assault and battery; and (2) those which would be
punishable only under the law of the United States, e.g., breach of
security regulations, violations of health, welfare and disciplinary
regulations relating solely to the conduct of military affairs. The
principal inquiry is whether an existing system of courts can be
utilized in the enforcement of such legislation or whether new courts
must be provided.
Trial by District Courts in the United States
The most obvious system of courts to use for the trial of these
civilians would be the federal district courts sitting in the United
States. Such a procedure would be in conformity with the current
practice of trying, in the district into which the offender is first
34 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); United States v. Bowman,
260 U.S. 94 (1922). See also, 1 Hyde, International Law 798-800 (1945).




brought, federal offenses committed outside the jurisdiction of any
state or district 0 However, the problems encountered in applying
this system to civilians accompanying our armed forces in foreign
lands for crimes committed in those lands are formidable.
First there is the problem of obtaining the consent of the re-
ceiving state. For crimes which would be violations of the law of
both the sending and receiving states, it is doubtful whether any
nation would consent to the removal of the accused from its territory
for trial. This conclusion is substantiated by a review of the NATO
Status of Forces AgreementY7 That agreement was predicated upon
the assumption that United States military jurisdiction extended not
only to the military contingent but also to members of the civilian
component and to dependents accompanying those forces overseas.
For offenses involving violations of the law of both the sending and
receiving states, the military authorities of the sending state were
given primary jurisdiction over members of the civilian component
only in relation to (1) inter se offenses and (2) offenses arising out
of an act done in the performance of official duty; 38 and such jurisdic-
tion was to be exercised within the receiving state.3 9 In all other situa-
tions involving the civilian component, it was to be the primary right
of the receiving state to try the accused." As for civilian dependents,
"... the drafters of the Agreement envisaged the power of the receiving
State ... not merely as a primary right to exercise concurrent juris-
diction, but rather as exclusive jurisdiction when the act in question
was an offense against the law of that State,"'" although in practice
this distinction between civilian employees and dependents seems never
to have been recognized or given effect.42 In view of the interest of
receiving states in maintaining their supremacy as territorial sovereigns
by punishing violations of their own law, or at least by having evi-
dence thereof close at hand,43 it is doubtful that in any renegotiation
of these agreements they would permit the removal of civilian de-
pendents and employees to the United States for trial of this class of
crimes. No such objections would likely be raised to removal where
no violation of local law was involved.
36 13 U.S.C. § 3237 (1948).
37 T.IA.S. 2846.
38 N.A.T.O. S.O.F., art. VII, par. 3 (a) (i), (ii).
39 Id., par. 1(a).
40 Id., par. 3 (b).
4' Snee & Pye, Status of Forces Agreement: Criminal jurisdiction 35 (1957).
42 Id., at 39. The authors state that they have seen no case in which foreign authori-
ties claimed or American authorities admitted any distinction in this regard between
dependents and members of the civilian component, the former being considered by
both parties as subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the sending State.
43 1 Hyde, International Law 815 (1922).
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Assuming that the problem of obtaining the consent of the re-
ceiving states can be overcome, there remain other serious objections
to trial in the United States. Compulsory process is essential to any
system of justice; but the attendance of foreign nationals as wit-
nesses in trials in this country would necessarily be on a voluntary
basis since, as a matter of international law, such attendance could
never be compelled.4 4 Therefore, many prosecutions would fail be-
cause of the government's inability to produce unwilling witnesses
whose presence would be necessary to accord the accused his con-
stitutional right to confrontation. And even if the government could
produce its witnesses, the accused would frequently be deprived of
the right to call witnesses on his own behalf because of the lack of
compulsory process. Also weighing heavily on the accused's ability
to present an adequate defense would be the expense involved in
defending a case far from the scene of the crime. It takes little
imagination to envision the costs which would be incurred in gather-
ing evidence in a foreign country and in transporting witnesses to
this country for the trial. Furthermore, the delay which would in-
evitably exist between the time of the commission of the crime and
the time of the trial would substantially decrease the deterrent value
of the prosecution, particularly as regards the violation of health,
welfare and disciplinary regulations, where the punishment, to be
effective, must be speedy and local 45 It is to be expected, therefore,
that only the most serious offenses would be brought to the United
States for trial. Hundreds of petty cases would go unprosecuted. In
the words of Justice Clark: "In short, this solution could only result
in the practical abdication of American judicial authority over most
of the offenses committed by American civilians in foreign countries.146
In view of the above considerations, it would seem that trial of
these persons by article III courts sitting in the United States, if
possible at all, would be unworkable as a general solution to the
problem.
Trial by Article III Courts in Receiving States
A second solution which has been suggested is the establishment
of article III courts in the nations in which our troops are stationed.
Bringing the courts to the accused would overcome many of the
difficulties connected with trial in the United States, but the establish-
ment of such courts presents a host of problems of its own.
There is again the problem of obtaining the consent of the re-
44 Id. at 732-33.
45 Supplemental Brief for Appellant and Petitioner on Rehearing, Reid v. Covert,
supra note 15, at 34-35.
46 Reid v. Covert, supra note 15, at 85 (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 21
COMMENTS
ceiving states. Indeed, the United States might well hesitate to ask it.
Commenting on this possibility in the Covert case, the government
counsel said:
The United States would be reluctant to ask countries to agree, as
one of the consequences of stationing United States troops within
their territory, that they allow the United States to establish a
system of civilian courts to sit in their country and to try American
civilians who accompany the armed forces for conduct for which
they could also be tried in the local courts. Any such request could
not avoid the implication that a fair trial would not be available
in the courts of the receiving state.47
Furthermore, after the Covert decision the United States might have
difficulty in justifying a claim for such a jurisdiction. Addressing
themselves to this issue Father Snee and Professor Pye had this to say:
. . . [T]he suggestion that dependents be tried by American
civilian courts for crimes committed in other NATO countries
overlooks the fact that the sole ground for a claim of jurisdiction
by the sending State over its dependents is their ultimate relation-
ship to the armed force or civilian component of whose members
they are dependents. If that relationship is so tenuous or non-
existent that it will not afford constitutional sanction for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by a military court, there would seem to be no
basis for the sending State to claim, nor for the receiving State to
grant, the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over dependents for
conduct which also constitutes an offense against the law of the
receiving State, any more than in the case of ordinary tourists.48
Supposing for the moment that the consent of the receiving states
could be obtained, there are nevertheless a number of other difficulties
inherent in this system. It would be manifestly impossible to set up
courts in each of the 63 countries in which American troops are
stationed. Not only would the cost be prohibitive, but it would also
be extremely difficult to staff such a great number of courts with
judges, clerks and other administrative personnel. Perhaps the num-
ber of courts required could be cut down by establishing districts,
with each district court having jurisdiction over crimes committed in
certain specified countries and either sitting permanently in one loca-
tion or sitting periodically in each country within its district. But
from what source would the jurors be drawn? A jury made up of
military personnel would be tantamount to a court martial and sub-
ject to the same danger of command influence. Juries drawn from
the civilian contingent would be subject to the same objection. The
impracticability of selecting jurors from among American tourists
47 Supplemental Brief for Appellant and Petitioner on Rehearing, Reid v. Covert
supra note 15, at 51.
48 Snee & Pye, supra note 41, at 44.
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travelling in foreign lands is obvious. The only remaining possibility
would be to use juries drawn from the local populace. However, such
jurors could not be compelled to attend the trial, and there would
be the additional problem in most countries of language differences.
Furthermore, in non-common law countries, the jury system would
be completely unfamiliar to the local citizenry and "would be tossed
about like a cork on unsettled waters." 49 Also not to be ignored are
the problems of compelling attendance of unwilling foreign witnesses,
punishing for contempt and providing sanctions for perjury.
In short, the alternative of establishing article III courts to
try offenders in foreign lands would at best be cumbersome and ex-
pensive and in all probability would be rejected if proposed.
Special Solution for Civilian Employees
The number of civilian employees with the armed forces is small
in comparison with the number of dependents; and the intimate rela-
tionship of this group to the military establishment makes it con-
venient for the United States to have local control over it."° Ob-
viously concerned about the effect of its decision on the control
formerly believed to exist over this group under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, the Supreme Court in McElroy v. Guagliardo5'
made the following suggestion as to possible alternative solutions:
One solution might possibly be to follow a procedure along the
line provided for paymasters' clerks as approved in Ex parte Reed.52
Another would incorporate those civilian employees who are sta-
tioned outside of the United States directly into the armed services,
either by compulsory induction or by voluntary enlistment. If a
doctor or dentist may be "drafted" into the armed services, ...
there should be no legal objection to the organization and recruit-
ment of other civilian specialists needed by the armed services.
Moreover, the armed services presently have sufficient authority
to set up a system for the voluntary enlistment of "specialists"
: . . It likewise appears entirely possible that the present "special-
ist" program conducted by the Department of the Army could be
utilized to replace civilian employees if disciplinary problems re-
quired military control .. .The increased cost to maintain these
49 Reid v. Covert, supra note 15, at 88 (dissenting opinion of Clark J.).
50 At the time of the Covert case (1957) there were more than 450,000 American
civilians overseas with the armed forces. Of these, about 415,000 were dependents and
38,000 were direct government employees and contractor employees. Reply Brief for
Appellant and Petitioner on Rehearing, Reid v. Covert, supra note 15, at 62.
51 Supra note 25, at 286-87.
52 Supra note 13. This case permitted the trial by court martial of a paymaster's
clerk in the Navy. He had been required to agree in writing "to submit to the laws
and regulations of the government and discipline of the Navy," id. at 19, had a fixed
rank and was required to wear a uniform.
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employees in a military status is the price the Government must
pay to comply with constitutional requirements.
Successful implementation of one or more of these suggested solutions
would solve the problem as to civilian employees. Bringing this
group into the military contingent would automatically bring them
under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice with-
out necessitating the slightest amendment of existing treaties. 53 Of
course, it is a matter of conjecture whether all civilian positions over-
seas could be "militarized." Many of these slots were formerly occu-
pied by military personnel and were converted to civilian positions
as part of "Operation Teammate," a scheme designed to cut the cost
of our overseas operations.54 There would be no problem in recon-
verting these positions. However, it is doubtful that full scale re-
placement with military personnel could ever be completely accom-
plished and eliminate the need for any civilian employees overseas.
There are, for example, a number of highly skilled contractor em-
ployees and technical representatives whose positions presumably
could not be converted. 5 As to these persons a different solution
53 When an armed force is in a country in pursuance of an agreement between
Governments, the terms of the agreement govern all questions of jurisdiction which are
the subject matter of the agreement. 1 Hyde, International Law 819-20 (1945). In the
absence of express agreement, it is a rule of international law that the consent to the
presence of foreign troops implies a waiver by the receiving State of at least a portion
of its local jurisdiction. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 139 (1812);
Oppenheim, International Law par. 445 (1928). But it has recently been held that this
rule only applies to persons who are actual members of the military force. Chow Hung
Ching v. The King, 77 C.L.R. 449 (1948). In that case a group of Chinese nationals
were in the Territory of New Guinea to collect surplus war supplies sold to China by
the United States. These persons were subject to Chinese military law and wore uni-
forms, but were not actually soldiers. Two laborers from this group were tried in a
local court for having assaulted a native of the island and were convicted. On appeal,
the High Court of Australia held that the accused were not "members" of a military
force and, therefore, had no immunity from the jurisdiction of local courts as might
have been possessed by a member of such force. It is questionable, therefore, whether
the Ex parte Reed solution suggested by Justice Clark (Supra note 13) would make a
person enough a "member" of our armed forces to bring him within the terms of the
treaty.
54 In 1956 the Army undertook the process of substituting 11,888 civilians for 12,495
military persons under the title "Operation Teammate." See Dept. of the Army Appro-
priations for 1956, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 4, 74, 296-97, 459-63, 1124-26. See also official
comment on Operation Teammate (Army Information Digest Vol. 10, No. 4 (Apr. 1955),
p. 47.
65 Reply Brief for Appellant and Petitioner on Rehearing, Reid v. Covert, supra
note 15, at 63. At that time there were with our armed forces overseas 1635 technical
representatives and 4500 contractor employees which the Government described as
"highly skilled technicians and advisors whose services are indispensable to a military
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would have to be worked out. Perhaps this small group could be
handled in the same manner as our foreign service employees. The
latter comprise a small group of highly selected personnel among
whom order and discipline is maintained by means of the deterrent
effect of reprimand, suspension without pay and dismissal.56 For more
serious crimes they are tried by the courts of the country in which
the offense is committed. It is quite possible that the same system
could be applied to the small number of highly skilled civilian em-
ployees of the armed forces who cannot be replaced directly with
military personnel.
The Probable Solution for Dependents
It has been seen that the legal and practical problems inherent
in the establishment of article III courts to try civilian dependents
and employees either in the United States or in the receiving states
are so formidable as to make either method impracticable as a gen-
eral solution to the problem. Dependents make up roughly 90%
of the American civilians overseas. 7 It is probably fair to say that
this group does not occupy as close a relation to the military estab-
lishment as do civilian employees since they are not directly engaged
in the accomplishment of the military mission. A course which Con-
gress might reasonably follow in dealing with this group would be to
leave them in the same position as American tourists-subject to
the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving states for all crimes con-
stituting violations of the laws of those states. It may be objected
that, depending upon the country involved, its courts may fail to
accord an accused certain rights which the Untied States considers
essential to a fair trial (e.g., the right to confrontation, the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to an impartial jury, etc.). Further
trial in a foreign court places an accused in a court where he is un-
familiar with the forms of procedure and where, in many cases, he
will be tried in a foreign language. A possible answer would be for
the United States to secure by treaty as many protections for its
service dependents as the foreign nations will accord. Under the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement, receiving and sending states are
pledged, among other things, to assist each other in obtaining evi-
dence and witnesses, to accord the right of confrontation and to allow
the accused to have legal representation of his own choice. 8 These
force which must increasingly rely on ever-changing and ever-more complicated scientific
equipment."
56 Reply Brief for Appellant and Petitioner on Rehearing, Reid v. Covert, supra note
15, at 73-74.
57 Ex parte Reed, supra note 13.
58 T.I.A.S. 2846. Section 9 of the Agreement read as follows: "Whenever a member
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provisions continue to apply even though dependents are beyond the
reach of military jurisdiction. Further, the United States could assist
the accused in securing competent foreign counsel or provide counsel
itself. As for those offenses which are not violations of foreign law,
it is believed that the threat of being sent back to the United States
would tend to influence dependents to comply with local base regula-
tions. And the threat of having to maintain separately those de-
pendents in the United States would encourage their servicemen-
husbands and fathers to exercise considerable discipline of their own.
William L. Clark
of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a
receiving State he shall be entitled (a) to a prompt and speedy trial; (b) to be informed,
in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made against him; (c) to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; (d) to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, if they are within the jurisdiction of the receiving State; (e) to
have legal representation of his own choice for his defense or to have free or assisted
legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in the receiving
State; (f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter;
and (g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State
and, when the rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present at his
trial"
